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The special theory of relativity (STR) is widely regarded as the primary threat to 
the otherwise intuitive presentist worldview.  In particular, both the relativity and 
conventionality of simultaneity within STR appear to undermine presentism and support 
eternalism.  However, the single term ‘simultaneity’ describes multiple potentially 
independent concepts.  By establishing the mutual independence of the relevant concepts 
of simultaneity, the presentist and eternalist may agree to move past the initial threat to 
presentism posed by STR.  The subsequent debate hinges on whether presentism or 
eternalism best accounts for the principle of relativity.  The presentist is often accused of 
initially failing to identify the absolute present and then constructing a model that hides it 
using an unlikely set of premises.  As a result, the eternalist Minkowski space-time 
interpretation appears simpler in many respects.  However, it is demonstrated that on 
presentism one may obtain the principle of relativity by simply prohibiting instantaneous 
signals between distant events.  Many of the objections against the presentist Neo-
Lorentzian interpretation of STR are answered in light of this demonstration.  The 
partition between the experimental evidence provided by STR and human experience is 
found to be unnecessary. 
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1 Introduction 
At first glance, the world appears to be three-dimensional since self-
consciousness is limited to the present moment.  Natural emotional responses to past, 
present, and future events generally differ.
2
  Putnam suggests that the man on the street 
regards his experience as evidence for presentism ([1967]), the view that only the present 
exists.
3
  Indeed, Scherr et al. find that physics students generally maintain their belief in 
absolute simultaneity despite instruction to the contrary ([2001], [2002]).  Of course, 
personal experience is not infallible.  Given decisive evidence, one ought to part with 
false conclusions based on illusory sense perceptions.
4
  For many, the special theory of 
relativity (STR) provides sufficient grounds to justify abandoning presentism in favour of 
eternalism, the view that the past, present, and future enjoy equal ontological status.   
For example, Putnam ([1967]) and Weingard ([1972]) have argued, respectively, 
that the relativity and conventionality of simultaneity each entail eternalism over 
presentism.  These two classic arguments are examined in Section 2 and are shown to 
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Specifically, Putnam writes that ‘All (and only) things that exist now are real. Future things (which do not 
already exist) are not real (on this view); although, of course they will be real when the appropriate time 
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4
 Craig argues that the reality of temporal becoming is a properly basic belief potentially strong enough to 
serve as an intrinsic defeater-defeater ([2001], p. 143). 
hinge on a dubious identification of three feasibly independent concepts of simultaneity.  
In fact, the absolute present must be independent of any (relative or conventional) present 
proposed by STR, either by virtue of its non-existence or its invisibility.  The subsequent 
debate hinges on whether presentism or eternalism best accounts for the principle of 
relativity, namely the concealed nature of the absolute present. 
Naturally, the eternalist requires the presentist to account for the hidden nature of 
the absolute present, an entity that simply does not exist on eternalism.  For example, 
Balashov and Janssen ([2003]) contrast the apparent complexity of Craig’s presentist 
interpretation of STR with the apparent simplicity of the eternalist Minkowski space-time 
interpretation.  Generally speaking, the presentist stands accused of relying on too many 
physical postulates to support a presentist worldview, an intellectual price that need not 
be paid by the eternalist.   
This eternalist challenge is addressed in Section 3.  Beginning merely with a 
prohibition against instantaneous distant signalling in absolute space, and clarifying the 
epistemic content of observation, the presentist may obtain a constructive theory that 
accounts for the principle of relativity and its wide application to all classical field 
theories potentially identified with conservation laws.  In Section 4, Craig’s presentist 
Neo-Lorentzian interpretation of STR is placed within the constructive theory of Section 
3.  This provides that interpretation with feasible postulates and answers the criticism that 
STR is more than just an electromagnetic theory.   
Lastly, the eternalist tends to assign the burden of proof to the presentist by 
erecting a partition between experimental evidence (provided by STR) and human 
experience.  This partition is briefly examined in Section 5 and shown to be unnecessary 
given that STR clearly fails to rule between presentism and eternalism.  Therefore, 
human experience cannot be easily dismissed on the basis of STR.  Although the initial 
sense perceptions of the man on the street are partially illusory, the existence of a doubly 
hidden absolute present remains both a rational and useful inference.   
2 The Relativity and Conventionality of Simultaneity 
2.1 Two Classic Arguments from STR 
The first major argument against presentism, driven by the authority of STR, is 
the argument from the relativity of simultaneity raised by Putnam ([1967]).  This 
approach is summarized in (Savitt [2000]; Bourne [2004]; Craig [2008], Callender 
[2008]), to name a few.  Interestingly, students at all levels are initially unconvinced by 
this argument and tend to instead form an erroneous ‘conceptual framework in which the 
ideas of absolute simultaneity and the relativity of simultaneity co-exist’(Scherr et al. 
[2001], [2002]).  I provide an abridged summary of the argument below, supposing 
throughout that observer A exists presently: 
(1) Only the present exists. 
(2) B exists if and only if A and B are simultaneous. 
(3) Simultaneity is relative to an observer’s motion. 
(4) B’s existence depends on the motion of A. 
Premise (1) is a simple summary of the presentist worldview.  Premise (2) provides the 
term ‘simultaneous’ with the metaphysical content of mutual present existence.  As 
defined, the conjunction of (1) and (2) requires that the present contain a set of 
simultaneous events.  By identifying ‘simultaneity’ in (3) with ‘simultaneous’ in (2), one 
must choose between keeping (1) and eliminating (4).  A Minkowski space-time diagram 
often accompanies this argument.
5
  If the space and time axes are held orthogonal (in 
Minkowski space-time
6), then observer A’s velocity determines the orientation of both 
the time and space axes.  B only exists on A’s spatial axis for a specific A velocity.  If the 
present is identified with the orthogonal spatial coordinate axes, then present existence 
clearly depends on observer motion.   
 The second argument against presentism driven by the authority of STR is based 
on the conventionality of simultaneity.  First raised by Weingard ([1972]) and also 
presented by Petkov ([1989]), this argument is similar to the previous one, substituting 
(3) and (4) with the following additional propositions: 
(5) Distant simultaneity is a matter of convention. 
(6) If B is distant from A, then the existence of B is a matter of convention. 
Proposition (5) is motivated by the impossible task of measuring the one-way speed of 
light without first choosing a coordinate synchronization scheme. See for example 
(Winnie [1970a], [1970b]; Petkov [1989]; Sonego and Pin [2009]).  If the ‘simultaneous’ 
of (2) is the same as the ‘simultaneity’ of (5), then (6) follows logically from (1), (2), and 
(5).  The presentist must abandon (1) or concede the truth of (6).  
The two arguments presented above have many variations, which generally aim to 
prove the absurdity of presentism by compelling the presentist to either reject presentism 
or accept that the existence of distant reality is observer dependent.  However, the term 
‘simultaneous’ has been used above to represent three potentially independent concepts.  
Indeed, STR already maintains that the ‘simultaneity’ of (3) is distinct from the 
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current frame of reference.  Otherwise, they are drawn at an acute angle bisected by the 45-degree speed of 
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‘simultaneity’ of (5).  Therefore, at best only one of the two arguments can go through.  If 
these three concepts are indeed independent, then the logical connections between 
premises (2), (3), and (5) are severed.  These three concepts are outlined below.   
2.2 A Shared Conclusion 
First, ‘standard simultaneity’ (SS) is a well-defined relation within STR.  
Malament ([1977]) has proven that Minkowski space-time provides a unique 
synchronization of distant clocks: orthogonal four-dimensional coordinates with the time 
axis tangential to the observer’s worldline.  The concept of orthogonal coordinates 
requires the use of a diagonal metric, which Minkowski space-time supplies.  Both the 
Einstein synchronization convention and slow clock transport produce standard 
simultaneity relations (Mansouri and Sexl [1977]).  Any synchronization method leading 
to standard simultaneity may be referred to as ‘internal synchronization of clocks’ 
(Mansouri and Sexl [1977]).  The term ‘relativity of simultaneity’ refers to the fact that 
observer motion determines which distant events stand in a standard simultaneity relation 
with respect to the observer.   
Secondly, ‘coordinate simultaneity’ (CS) is a coordinate dependent relation 
between events on a four-dimensional manifold.  If two events share the same time 
coordinate value in a given coordinate system, then they are coordinate-simultaneous 
with respect to that coordinate system.  Standard simultaneity is simply coordinate 
simultaneity with the addition requirement that the coordinates are orthogonal according 
to the Minkowski metric.  Through an ‘external synchronization of clocks’ one observer 
may adopt the coordinate simultaneity of another observer in relative motion, although 
this will inevitably lead to non-orthogonal coordinates (Mansouri and Sexl [1977]).  The 
freedom to use either orthogonal or non-orthogonal coordinates is commonly referred to 
as the ‘conventionality of simultaneity’.7   
Thirdly, ‘absolute simultaneity’ (AS), is the presentist metaphysical relation 
between two existing events.  In principle, one could design a coordinate system in which 
coordinate and absolute simultaneity coincide.
8
  Indeed, if an observer were at absolute 
rest, standard simultaneity would coincide with absolute simultaneity.  The validity of 
presentism is tied to the existence of the absolute simultaneity relation.   
For the purposes of this discussion, a frame of reference for a given observer is a 
special coordinate system in which the spatial location of the observer is regarded as a 
constant.  A frame of reference may use either SS or CS coordinates depending on 
whether the coordinate system is orthogonal relative to the Minkowski metric.  Naturally, 
if an observer is in absolute motion, SS and AS relations will not coincide.  However, the 
observer is still free to choose a coordinate system in which CS and AS relations coincide 
through an external synchronization of clocks.   
In light of this classification of concepts, we may amend (2), (3), and (5) as 
follows: 
(2’) B exists if and only if A and B are absolutely simultaneous. 
(3’) Standard simultaneity is relative to an observer’s motion. 
(5’)  Distant coordinate simultaneity is a matter of convention. 
Premises (1), (2’), and (3’) do not imply (4) unless absolute simultaneity is identified 
with standard simultaneity.  Premises (1), (2’), and (5’) do not imply (6) unless absolute 
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 Namely, the entire present consisting of all existing events may be indexed by three linearly independent 
variables.  A fourth variable would be used to denote time as the absolute present evolves.  
simultaneity is identified with coordinate simultaneity.  Therefore, to avoid (4) and (6), 
an undesirable observer-dependent reality, the presentist and eternalist may agree that: 
(7) If absolute simultaneity relations exist, then they are independent of both 
standard and coordinate simultaneity relations. 
 
Note that STR does not forbid SS and CS relations from coinciding within a given frame 
of reference.  Similarly, (7) does not forbid AS relations from coinciding with a particular 
choice of CS or SS relations.  Independence simply ensures that the coincidence 
represents a special case rather than a fundamental connection between concepts.
9
  
Although the presentist and eternalist are opposed concerning (1), they must agree about 
(7).  
3 A Presentist Interpretation of STR 
 Having identified the common ground shared by the presentist and eternalist, the 
debate shifts towards who can best explain the principle of relativity.  The task for the 
presentist is to either identify the absolute present or clearly demonstrate why that task is 
impossible.  The eternalist argues that it is impossible to identify the absolute present 
within STR simply because it doesn’t exist; all events are equally real.  Relativistic 
phenomena such as length contraction and clock retardation are regarded as best 
explained by the structure of an existing four-dimensional Minkowski space-time 
(Balashov and Janssen [2003]; Petkov [2007], Norton [2008]).  Furthermore, the success 
of modern relativistic field theory developed within Minkowski space-time seems to 
justify the eternalist position.  On the other hand, the presentist seems compelled to hold 
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 In this paper I am interested in whether such a special case could plausibly exist.  I therefore limit the 
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that the absolute present is hidden from observation due to the electromagnetic physical 
effects of Lorentz contraction and clock retardation.  As a result, presentism stands 
accused of postulating the Lorentz covariance of all physical field theories ad hoc in 
order to hide the absolute present from the observer (Balashov and Janssen [2003]).  
Indeed, many presentists feel compelled to look outside of STR at quantum mechanical 
or general relativistic arguments for the existence of the absolute present (Bourne [2004]; 
Callender [2008]).  Nonetheless, there remain good reasons to infer the existence of an 
unobservable distant absolute present within STR. 
3.1 Theories of Principle and Constructive Theories 
Balashov and Janssen ([2003]) hold that if STR is regarded strictly as a theory of 
principle, then it does not reveal the ontology of space and time.  Rather, if certain 
postulates hold true in a given world, then their implications will also hold true in that 
world.  As a theory of principle, STR rests on two postulates: 
(8) There are no (ontologically) preferred inertial observers.10 
(9) The speed of light is isotropic and independent of both observer and source 
motion.
11
 
 
Of course, these postulates are not conversely proven by the verification of their 
experimental implications.  Constructive theories of relativity,
12
 however, may be built 
upon various three-dimensional presentist or four-dimensional eternalist ontologies, 
provided that the model proposed explains the relevant experimental evidence (Balashov 
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 There are a variety of ways to express this principle.  For the eternalist, no preferred observer exists since 
no absolute space exists to pick out a single ignorant preferred observer; there are no ontologically 
preferred inertial observers.  Generally, the presentist would state that no preferred observer has objective 
knowledge of being at rest in absolute space; there are no epistemically preferred inertial observers.   
11
 This postulate is often misunderstood.  For clarification, see (Baierlein [2006]). 
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 The term ‘constructive theory’ is used here in the sense described by Balashov and Janssen ([2003]) and 
not in the sense described by Norton ([2008]).  The debate between presentism and eternalism addressed 
here is not simply a debate between the relational and substantival positions. 
and Janssen [2003]).  One such presentist theory, the Neo-Lorentzian interpretation 
(Craig [2008]), is often criticized on two counts.  First, Balashov and Janssen regard the 
theory as ‘triply-amended’ ([2003]), requiring too many postulates and resulting in too 
few useful implications.  As a result, the principle of relativity is implicitly postulated 
rather than explained (Norton [2008]).  Secondly, the Neo-Lorentzian interpretation 
appears to say little about non-electromagnetic phenomena, thereby ceding credibility to 
Minkowski space-time as a common origin for all relativistic effects (Balashov and 
Janssen [2003]; Norton [2008]).  It seems that the task of the presentist is to build a 
constructive model that explains, rather than postulates, both the principle of relativity 
and its application to non-electromagnetic systems.  In what follows, the substantival 
existence of absolute space is assumed and a prohibition against instant signalling is 
postulated.  The relativity principle, namely the prohibition against detecting motion 
through absolute space, is shown to follow from these postulates.   
3.2 Epistemic Content of Observation 
The light speed postulate of STR, represented by premise (9), places firm limits 
on objective knowledge of the world by denying the observer immediate awareness of 
distant events.  However, the key implications of (9) are not due to the isotropy of the 
speed of light, or even the agreement between all observers about the one-way speed of 
light (Sonego and Pin [2009]).  Stripping (9) of these requirements, we consider the 
following revised postulate:   
 (9’) Distant instantaneous physical signalling or communication is prohibited. 
Both human experience and experimental evidence confirm this prohibition.  The 
potential exception involves entangled quantum particles.  However, it is clear that these 
theoretically instantaneous signals are of no use for communication (Callender [2008]). 
As a result, the distant present is effectively invisible.  The present is only experienced 
locally; observations of distant events are always observations of the past.  Therefore, 
only local observations made at one’s current location contribute to one’s direct 
knowledge of the absolute present.   
What about indirect knowledge?  Premise (9’) immediately suggests an 
interesting distinction between perception and observation, first suggested by Terrell 
([1959]).
13
  The following definitions apply for the purpose of this discussion.  A 
perception is the present local awareness of any number of simultaneously received 
signals, arriving from different directions, with various intensities, and potentially 
emitted at different times.  Each signal conveys information about its source’s past, while 
the presently existing source remains hidden.  On the other hand, an observation consists 
of placing perceived data into a three-dimensional model that accounts for the 
simultaneous emission and original locations of the multiple signals perceived.  Signal 
perception may be considered a local observation of the signal since it is independent of 
both perceiver motion and coordinate simultaneity.  
To illuminate these definitions with an example from STR, consider a photograph 
taken of an object flying past the photographer at a relativistic speed.  Terrell 
demonstrates that given STR, the Lorentz contraction is invisible to the perceiver, 
regardless of relative motion of the object and the photographer ([1959]).
14
  Of course, 
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 Terrell ([1959]) differentiates between seeing and observing in terms of simultaneous reception versus 
simultaneous emission of light signals.  The term ‘perceive’ is intended to extend Terrell’s ‘seeing’ to 
include non-electromagnetic signals and signals traveling at various speeds. 
14
 This result holds over small solid angles.  The observer’s field of view undergoes a conformal 
transformation resulting in image magnification proportional to the Doppler shift.  Objects appear rotated 
rather than contracted (Terrell [1959]). Nevertheless, the Lorentz contraction is not strictly perceived.  
one may observe the phenomenon by using SS coordinates to calculated the nature of the 
optical illusion and remove it from the photographs. See for example (Deissler [2005]).  
However, if CS coordinates are used, a different type of optical illusion will be edited out 
of the picture.
15
  One photograph yields a multitude of observations, each connected to a 
specific choice of coordinate simultaneity. 
In order to form a distant observation without instantaneous signals, a frame of 
reference is required to classify the information provided by means of perception.  Since 
frame of reference depends on both observer motion and synchrony preference (SS or CS 
relations), then the invariant component of any observation is the information perceived.  
An observer is firstly a perceiver.  Therefore, it follows from (1) and (9’) that: 
(10) The epistemic content of observation is limited to local perceptions 
independent of coordinate simultaneity and observer motion. 
 
We now apply premise (10) to some fairly simple examples. Consider first the 
one-way velocity of light.
16
  Perceiver A is required to record the emission of a light 
signal at a local time.  Distant perceiver B is required to record the arrival of that light 
signal at a different local time.  Both perceptions count as local observations.  However, 
to combine them, the clocks of both perceivers must be synchronized.  Therefore the 
observation of the one-way velocity of light is not directly perceived and cannot become 
a synchrony-independent law.  Interestingly, when discussing light signals, one may not 
confirm the stronger condition (9) given the truth of the weaker condition (9’).  
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 Terrell’s derivation of the invisibility of the Lorentz contraction rests solely on the Lorentz 
transformation of angular the spatial coordinates ([1959]).  Since it does not depend on any specific time 
transformation, this result also holds for alternate coordinate simultaneities.  Therefore, the Lorentz 
contraction is equally invisible for observers using CS and SS coordinates, in agreement with the 
conventionality of simultaneity.   
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 There is a great deal of literature on this topic.  Some examples advocating the conventionality of 
simultaneity include (Tangherlini [2009]; Winnie [1970a], [1970b]; Mansouri and Sexl [1977]; Selleri 
[2005]; Sonego and Pin [2009]; Iyer and Prabhu [2010]; Grünbaum [2010]). 
Next, consider the process of counting distant sources.  Suppose perceiver A is 
constantly receiving signals from discrete sources within a region of finite volume.  In 
principle, a qualified perceiver could record the angular position and signal intensity of 
each incoming signal at the given moment.  By producing successive source charts, 
analogous to star charts, perceiver A could determine that the number of observable 
sources in the region is fixed.  Much like an air traffic controller uses radar to confirm 
that airborne aircraft are neither created nor destroyed, a suitably equipped perceiver 
could count the number of perceived particles of a given signal type at any given 
moment.  Subsequently, the perceiver could conclude that these source particles are 
neither created nor destroyed.  If a conservation law for source particles can be perceived 
as a local observation, then this conservation law is independent of simultaneity 
conventions.
17
  
Alternatively, an experimenter could set up a laboratory suitably equipped with 
instruments to locally detect the presence of signal sources.  In order to record the times 
and locations of each local detection, the detector locations must be indexed using a 
laboratory spatial coordinate system.  Next, the clocks on each detector, which are 
presumed to operate identically, must be synchronized in a suitable manner.  Clock 
transport, supposedly isotropic signals, and external clock synchronization are all 
potential methods.  The main criteria for clock synchronization is that the 0t  index 
moves faster than the sources through the laboratory in absolute space, in order to avoid 
counting a source twice.  At any moment, as defined by coordinate simultaneity criteria, 
the experimenter could count the number sources detected within the laboratory.  Re-
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 It is assumed that the perceiver is travelling at a velocity suitable for the reception of signals from any 
angle.  This limits the perceiver to velocities less than the signal speed while making accurate perceptions. 
synchronizing the detector clocks according to a different CS relation, the experimenter 
could repeat the counting experiment.  Provided that no source is counted twice, and that 
the sources endure in time, the number of sources detected simultaneously is an invariant 
property of the system.   
In light of these examples, the argument may be expressed as follows.  On 
presentism (1), all that exists forms a three-dimensional manifold 0  evolving through 
time.  Provided that no particle or signal travels at an actually infinite speed (9’), and 
therefore endures beyond the present moment, then 0 is a Cauchy surface.  A Cauchy 
surface intersects each particle and signal worldline exactly once within the direct 
product space R0 .  The existence of the single ‘Cauchy surface’ 0  implies that 
R0  is diffeomorphic to ),( gM , a globally hyperbolic (pseudo-Reimannian) metric 
space  (Dieckmann [1988]).  When suitably diagonalized, metric g reduces to the 
Minkowski metric   (Nakahara [2003], p. 245). 
In practice, there exist multiple CS schemes where no source or signal is counted 
twice.  Each of these corresponds to a Cauchy surface   within the metric space 
),( 0 gR .  Therefore, each space R  is also diffeomorphic to ),( gM .  If there are 
multiple Cauchy surfaces permitted by ),( gM , it is unclear which corresponds with 
absolute space 0 .  It is clear that the existence of just one Cauchy surface 0  is 
sufficient to establish that R0  is globally hyperbolic and diffeomorphic to ),( gM .  
Therefore, provided that we exclusively use CS coordinates that fit Cauchy surfaces  , 
then: 
(11) Particle conservation laws are perceivable, independent of both observer 
motion and coordinate simultaneity convention.   
 To summarize, we may begin with presentism (1) and a prohibition against 
instantaneous signalling (9’) and conclude that the epistemic content of observation is 
limited to local perceptions (10).  Any one-way non-zero velocity is not strictly 
perceivable, illustrating the conventionality of (9).  On the other hand, particle 
conservation laws are in principle perceivable and may be described using a wide range 
of suitable coordinate systems (11). Therefore,  
(12) Conservation laws obey the epistemic principle of relativity.  One may not 
use conservation laws to detect absolute motion. 
 
3.3 Presentist Covariant Field Theory 
 If conservation laws obey the principle of relativity, then the field theories 
associated with each conservation law must also obey the principle of relativity.  To 
demonstrate this, one must consider the standard variational approach used to model 
physical fields.  Mills ([1989]) provides an excellent overview.  At the fundamental level, 
a physical system may be described using a Lagrangian density functional of both 
dependent and independent variables.  Independent variables consist of the space and 
time coordinates.  Dependent variables consist of various functions of space and time, 
namely the fields.
18
  The action is the integral of the Lagrangian with respect to the 
independent variables over some specified range of their values.  Physical laws are 
generally
19
 taken to be configurations of the fields that leave the action unchanged under 
slight variations (adjustments) of the fields, the space-time coordinates, or the region of 
integration.  
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 As a result, the Lagrangian may not explicitly contain independent variables yet still implicitly depend on 
space and time coordinates through space and time dependencies of the field functions.   
19
 This requires the application of Hamilton’s principle.  See (Mills [1989]; Brown and Holland [2004]). 
 For any given field theory, one may obtain the conservation laws for energy and 
momentum by holding the action constant with respect to either small variations of the 
boundaries of the region of integration (Barut [1980], pp. 103-105,115) or small 
variations of the metric on a general four-dimensional manifold described by the 
independent variables (Nakahara [2003], pp. 298-300).  Put simply, energy and 
momentum conservation laws follow from one’s freedom to use alternative coordinate 
systems to describe the evolution of a physical system (Mills [1989]).  On the other hand, 
the field equations that govern the physical fields are obtained by holding the action 
constant while varying the dependent variables, or fields (Barut [1980], pp. 99-103).  In 
general, the mathematical identity known as Noether’s theorem correlates field theories 
with conservation laws.  See for example (Plybon [1971]; Al-Kuwari and Taha [1991]; 
Brown and Holland [2004]).   
The distinction between variations of the fields and variations of the coordinates 
is critical to the present discussion.
20
  Variations of the fields that leave the Lagrangian 
unchanged correspond to both the field equations and the conserved field sources.  These 
variations are often referred to as internal symmetries or gauge symmetry groups (Mills 
[1989]).  By comparison, variations of the coordinate system correspond to the 
conservation laws of energy and momentum.  Surprisingly, the Lorentz transformations 
of STR do not play a necessary role in either type of variation.  First, the symmetry group 
formed by the Lorentz transformations is independent of the ‘internal symmetries’ 
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 See Table I in (Barut [1980], p. 102) for several examples of field equations due to the variation of the 
Lagrangian with respect to the fields.  Also see Table II in (Barut [1980], p. 117) for examples of both 
conserved sources and energy and momentum conservation due to variations of the action with respect to 
the fields and the coordinate respectively. 
represented by the gauge transformation groups governing each field theory.
21
  Secondly, 
the Lorentz transformations are simply a single case of the generalized coordinate 
transformation that corresponds to energy and momentum conservation.  Multiple 
symmetries can lead to the same conserved quantities.  In the case of internal symmetries, 
both global and local continuous symmetries lead to the same conserved values (Al-
Kuwari and Taha [1991]).  Similarly, energy and momentum conservation is correlated 
with invariance of the action under general continuous coordinate transformations (Barut 
[1980], pp. 108; Nakahara [2003], pp. 298-300).  The Lorentz transformations represent a 
specific case; they are sufficient but not necessary for energy and momentum 
conservation laws.  Therefore, the claim of Balashov and Janssen ([2003]) that reality 
only corresponds to concepts that are invariant under Lorentz group of transformations is 
unjustified.  The Lorentz group does not uniquely define energy and momentum 
conservation and is independent of the relevant gauge transformation groups.  Rather, one 
may conclude that: 
(13) Energy and momentum conservation laws correspond to the freedom to 
describe a system using alternate coordinate systems. 
 
(14) Fields equations and conserved field sources correspond to the freedom to 
describe the fields using different gauges. 
 
The task of the physicist is often to choose the correct Lagrangian
22
 to describe 
any system under consideration.  Given a Lagrangian, the physical laws governing energy 
and momentum conservation, conserved currents, and the distribution of the fields follow 
naturally from the variational principle.  Experiment is required to determine which field 
theory corresponds to which conservation law.  Since conservation laws obey the 
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 Gauge symmetry groups U(1), SU(2), and SU(3) exist independently of the Lorentz transformations. 
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 Two Lagrangians will yield the same physical laws if their difference is simply a gradient with respect to 
the independent variables (Barut [1980], p. 101; Brown and Holland [2004]). 
principle of relativity (12), it follows that the field theory corresponding to a given 
conservation law may be constructed in any coordinate system in which the conservation 
law holds, not solely frames of reference connected by Lorentz transformations.  
Therefore, it follows from (12), (13), and (14) that: 
(15) If a conservation law obeys the principle of relativity, then the 
corresponding field theory obeys the principle of relativity. 
 
 In light of this argument, it is clear that the presentist is not obligated to detect the 
present since the present is doubly hidden by the finite signal speed restriction (9’).  First, 
the finite signal speed forbids perception of distant present events.  Second, the inference 
of the number of presently existing sources from the number of perceived signals 
received implies that the conservation laws governing the sources are coordinate frame 
independent.  Using variational calculus, Noether’s theorem, and experiment, a field 
theory may be assigned to each conservation law, regardless of coordinate choice.  As a 
result, the observer will not observe any deviations from the expected absolute frame 
field theory in a moving frame of reference.  Therefore, given presentism (1) and the 
prohibition against instantaneous signals (9’), it follows that: 
(8’) There are no (epistemically) preferred inertial observers. 
4 Objections Towards the Neo-Lorentzian Interpretation 
 Balashov and Janssen ([2003]) raise at least two major objections against the 
presentist Neo-Lorentzian interpretation of STR, both of which relate to the principle of 
relativity.  First, the presentist relies on too many postulates to obtain the Lorentz 
covariance of electromagnetic phenomena.  Secondly, the presentist fails to explain the 
Lorentz covariance of non-electromagnetic phenomena.  One may answer both objections 
by placing the Neo-Lorentzian interpretation within the model presented in Section 3.  
Concerning the second objection, the constructive field theory developed above may be 
considered a generalized version of the electromagnetic Neo-Lorentzian interpretation 
criticized by Balashov and Janssen in ([2003]).  Having perceived conservation of 
electric charge, one may experimentally rule out all potential Lagrangians furnished by 
Noether’s theorem that do not yield Maxwell’s equations and the Lorentz force law.  It is 
clear from the discussion above that any field theory that may be developed using a 
Lagrangian and the variational approach fits within the presentist worldview.  The Neo-
Lorentzian interpretation merely considers electromagnetism, an Abelian gauge theory.  
Non-Abelian gauge theories rely on the same mathematical structure and may in principle 
be treated in an analogous fashion, without recourse to eternalism. 
 We now consider the first objection and specifically examine the electromagnetic 
case.  Balashov and Janssen ([2003]) claim that the Neo-Lorentzian theory is ‘triply 
amended’ and posits extra unnecessary structure to reality in order to obtain the relativity 
principle.  In particular, they accuse the presentist, specifically the Neo-Lorentzian, of 
assuming Newtonian mechanics, Maxwell’s electrodynamics, Lorentz contraction, clock 
retardation, standard simultaneity relations, and ultimately the Lorentz covariance of all 
non-electromagnetic field theories in order to explain the experimental data supporting 
the principle of relativity ([2003]).   
By way of an overall response, it is clear from Section 3 that the Neo-Lorentzian 
interpretation can be firmly grounded in presentism (1) and the reality of the prohibition 
against instant signals (9’).  The rest is up to experiment to determine whether the 
conserved charge observed is indeed electric or part of a different field theory.  
Furthermore, the theory criticized in (Balashov and Janssen [2003]) need not depend on 
such a wide range of postulates.  Concerning the number of postulates, Erlichson ([1973]) 
provides a historical overview of the postulates and implications of the ‘Lorentz Theory 
A’ (LTA), ‘Lorentz Theory B’ (LTB), and STR.   It seems that Balashov and Janssen 
([2003]) level their criticism against a combination of LTA and LTB, thereby supposing 
that the presentist must adopt the postulates of both models.  However, the LTA 
postulates an ether, rod contraction, and clock retardation; it then derives the Lorentz 
transformations and the relativity principle as a result.  The LTB postulates an ether and 
the covariance of Maxwell’s equations; it then derives the Lorentz transformations, rod 
contraction, and clock retardation (Erlichson [1973]).  The presentist isn’t committed to 
assuming the postulates of both the LTA and the LTB.  Rather one is free to assume the 
postulates of the LTA, the LTB, or potentially just (1) and (9’), as discussed above. 
Specific responses concerning the use of Newtonian mechanics and standard 
simultaneity relations are in also order.  First, Balashov and Janssen ([2003]) criticize the 
Neo-Lorentzian interpretation for adopting Newtonian mechanics.  Perhaps this objection 
follows from the false dilemma raised between the Galilean covariance of Newtonian 
mechanics and the Lorentz covariance of Maxwell’s equations.  See (Tangherlini [2009]) 
for a detailed examination of this false dilemma.
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  Since these two symmetry groups 
differ concerning the relativity of simultaneity (Baierlein [2006]), and the Lorentz group 
has greater experimental confirmation, one might suppose that simultaneity must be 
relative.  However, the absolute Lorentz transformations (ALT) first developed by 
Tangherlini ([2009]), and further discussed in (Mansouri and Sexl [1977]; Selleri [2005]; 
Iyer and Prabhu [2010]), satisfy the experimental data while conserving simultaneity 
relations.  This approach is particularly useful when considering accelerating systems 
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 Tangherlini’s 1958 dissertation was recently made available as ([2009]). 
(Selleri [2008]).  Using Tangherlini’s mechanics, objects with mass cannot be accelerated 
beyond the speed of light, in agreement with STR (Tangherlini [2009]).  The essential 
difference between Tangherlini’s ALT transformations and STR lays in the use of CS 
rather than SS relations.  Furthermore, in light of (13), energy and momentum 
conservation is not violated by the use of alternative coordinate systems.  As with the 
one-way velocity of light, the relativity of simultaneity is not part of the epistemic 
content of experimental observational physics. 
Second, the Neo-Lorentzian is criticized for using standard simultaneity rather 
than absolute simultaneity relations between events (Balashov and Janssen [2003]).  In 
light of the discussion in Section 3, is seems that these criticisms are generally 
unwarranted.  Since the absolute present is out of epistemic reach, the presentist is free to 
regard the one-way speed of light as isotropic by convention.  Clearly, the corresponding 
SS relations are the simplest.  However, the presentist may wish to use CS rather than SS 
relations.  In this case, Maxwell’s equations would simply adopt their macroscopic form 
within a non-linear electrically polarized medium, thereby allowing for anisotropic light 
propagation by convention.  This hardly constitutes a violation of the principle of 
relativity; namely, charge conservation is not violated.  Therefore, SS is not required to 
uphold the principle of relativity.   
Nonetheless, Balashov and Janssen ([2003]) suggest that the SS scheme is 
preferred since it may be obtained using either light signals or bullets to synchronized 
distant clocks.  In doing so, they assume that if a specific amount of kinetic energy is 
imparted to a projectile of fixed rest mass, then the one-way velocity will be independent 
of the direction of projectile motion.
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  Thought experiments of this sort are criticized by 
Ungar ([1988]) for presupposing the absence of the very anisotropic effects that they 
intend to rule out.  The concept of an observed one-way velocity is meaningless without 
first adopting a synchronization convention (Sonego and Pin [2009]).  The use of CS 
relations does not constitute a violation of the principle of relativity but rather provides an 
alternate framework within which to make experimental observations.   
To summarize, the presentist need not assume the combined postulates of the 
LTA and the LTB, Newtonian mechanics, or SS relations.  The LTA, LTB, and the 
model in Section 3 each provide a simple set of postulates and serve as constructive 
theories to be assessed individually.  The presentist isn’t committed to Newtonian 
mechanics in order to retain absolute simultaneity.  Rather, the presentist simply requires 
that the relativity of simultaneity does not constitute an experimentally proven fact.  
Indeed, Tangherlini’s ([2009]) absolute Lorentz transformations conserve simultaneity 
relations upon transformation yet provide the same experimental results using an 
alternative synchrony scheme.  Nonetheless, the presentist is free to use SS relations 
since they are usually the simplest option available for converting perceptions into 
observations.  However, CS coordinates may be simpler to use in some cases, such as 
accelerating systems (Selleri [2008]).  Any dynamical experiment will not yield isotropic 
results if non-standard CS coordinates are used.  This is an artefact of the coordinate 
system just as SS coordinates are characterized by spatial isotropy (Sonego and Pin 
[2009]). 
5 The Man on the Street and Presentism 
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 Regarding the dynamics of particles without assuming isotropic light propagation, see (Selleri [1996]; 
Sonego and Pin [2009]). 
 We now return to Putnam’s ([1967]) man on the street, having carefully 
considered the implications that presentism ought to have for physics.  There is one 
additional objection that might yet hold weight with the man on the street.  The eternalist 
tends to assign the burden of proof to the presentist by erecting a partition between 
experimental evidence and human experience.  For example, Callender writes ([2000]): 
‘Here I can only ask, if science cannot find the 'becoming frame', what 
extra-scientific reason is there for positing it? If the answer is our 
experience of becoming, we are essentially stating that our brains 
somehow have access to a global feature of the world that no experiment 
can detect. This is rather spooky.’ 
 
Savitt ([2000]) similarly suggests that ‘If the present is indeed so elusive, I find it difficult 
to imagine what aid or comfort it could be to a metaphysician.’  In practice, this partition 
is both ill defined and unnecessary.  Does the well-tested hypothesis that all observers 
experience one moment at a time belong to mere human experience or constitute 
experimental evidence?  Clearly physics, including STR, is unsuited to test this 
hypothesis yet the hypothesis remains testable.  Since STR does not rule between 
presentism and eternalism, it is unnecessary to consider human experience as misleading.  
The partition between STR and human experience only serves to prevent one from taking 
human experience seriously. 
One potential response to Callender ([2000]) and Savitt ([2000]) may be sketched 
as follows.  In terms of human experience, the fundamental difference between temporal 
becoming and absolute motion is that on presentism, temporal becoming involves locally 
experiencing the creation (and subsequent destruction) of moments in time.  Absolute 
motion on the other hand involves translation from one absolute location to another, both 
of which are likely identical by nature.  Only able to experience the here and now, why 
shouldn’t the mind detect an ontological gradient in the time direction yet not notice 
translation between equally existing spatial locations?  Arguably, the absolute present is 
locally detectable and remains a stubborn reality for the reflective and unreflective 
individual alike.  Without access to the distant absolute present, one is clearly unable to 
identify distant absolute simultaneity whereas the local present is unmistakable.     
It seems that for the man on the street, the burden of proof lies squarely with the 
eternalist and that human experience demands an explanation.  However, STR does not 
justify eternalism over presentism.  Against the eternalist charge than an absolute present 
adds extra structure to Minkowski space-time, the presentist may rightly retort that 
Minkowski space-time adds extra structure to the absolute present.  The eternalist belief 
that the absolute present ought to explicitly reveal itself is unjustified.  It is clear that the 
absolute present is doubly hidden as a result of the prohibition against instantaneous 
signalling (9’).   The belief that an absolute present ought to yield experimental or 
theoretical results different from absolute Minkowski space-time is unwarranted since 
conservation laws are observable independently of both synchrony and motion.  Field 
theories correlated to conservation laws are similarly coordinate independent; rather they 
depend on variations and internal symmetries of the fields themselves.   
To summarize, the two classic arguments against presentism based on the 
relativity and conventionality of simultaneity do not obtain without forcing a connection 
between the relative, conventional, and absolute present.  The subsequent debate then 
hinges on who can provide a satisfactory explanation of the principle of relativity.  
Fortunately for the presentist, the principle of relativity is not postulated ad hoc; it 
follows naturally from the absence of instantaneous signalling.  As a result, the partition 
erected between human experience and experimental evidence is unnecessary since STR 
does not rule against human experience.  Therefore, one is free to choose between 
presentism and eternalism for some reason other than STR. 
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